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 ABSTRACT 
Consequence management radiological dose assessors make several assumptions in 
dose projections regarding radionuclide depositions following a radiological release 
from a nuclear power plant. During training and exercises these coordinators and dose 
assessors make assumptions that the radionuclide deposition ratios will remain constant, 
only varying in terms of radioactive decay and weathering. This assumption is 
sometimes made regardless of large spatial and terrain variations. Following the 
Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 
Consequence Management Response Teams (CMRT) assisted in consequence 
management operations in Japan. Part of their work included taking air samples and in 
situ measurements using high purity germanium detectors throughout certain areas of the 
country. On this research the validity of the aforementioned assumption was examined 
by analysis of the in situ measurements obtained by the U.S. response teams and the 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). Using isotopic ratios for a LWR core-damage 
accident, from FRMAC Manual Volume 3, a comparison was made with the collected in 
situ measurement data to determine how the FRMAC values compared against actual 
measured data. The main radionuclides considered in this evaluation were 134Cs, 136Cs, 
137Cs and 131I. The goal of this comparison was to determine the validity of the training 
and exercise assumptions with regard to a real incident.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
Today one of the major debates around the world is the fate and danger of nuclear 
energy. Harnessing nuclear energy for electricity production came after the development 
of the first nuclear bomb, which was first tested in 1945. The testing of nuclear weapons 
and the display of their power has instilled fear in many people, which has led to protests 
against nuclear power all over the world. Accidents at nuclear power plants over the 
years have added to this fear. There have been small-scale accidents, but the major well-
known accidents, are the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima-Daiichi 
incidents. These three incidents have greatly influenced how the public perceives nuclear 
risk. With everything some risk is involved, regardless of how small that risk, people and 
countries need to be prepared to adapt and handle any problems that may occur.  
 All over the world there are emergency response professionals that are trained to 
respond effectively and provide support for several different emergency scenarios. A 
nuclear or radiological emergency is no different.  There are several teams trained to 
specifically respond to emergencies of this sort.  Radiological emergencies do not occur 
often but it is always necessary for emergency responders to be prepared if an 
emergency ever were to occur. Radiological emergency response professionals engage in 
many training exercises to ensure that they are always prepared to respond to an 
emergency. For these exercises the response scenarios can only be simulated and to do 
this the professionals make assumptions for the scenario at hand. These assumptions 
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help to create ideal situations for the responders, which may not always be the case 
during an actual nuclear/radiological incident.   
 The assumptions that are made are practical but, to ensure that the response 
professionals are prepared for any situation, it is necessary to have assumptions that can 
and will relate as closely as possible to a real scenario. During exercises for radiological 
emergencies one main assumption typically made is that radionuclide deposition ratios 
will remain constant, only varying in terms of decay and weathering. Assumptions like 
these help to simplify the exercise scenarios and create an ideal response situation. The 
recent Fukushima incident was not an ideal situation since there were many releases 
along with drastic changes to the weather conditions. With the Fukushima incident not 
being an ideal situation, provides the perfect opportunity to determine if the 
aforementioned assumption will hold true outside of exercises.  This research helped to 
validate whether or not radionuclide deposition ratios will remain constant, when there 
are large spatial and terrain variations along with inclement weather.  
Two Major Radiological Incidents (Chernobyl and Fukushima) 
 The two most recent nuclear reactor accidents that resonate in many people’s minds 
are the Chernobyl and Fukushima incidents. From Chernobyl to the more recent 
Fukushima incident a great deal of progress has been made regarding the response to 
radiological incidents and the capabilities of the responders. With better capabilities the 
response to the Fukushima event and the data available should be superior to that of the 
Chernobyl accident. There are very large sets of data for both events but with the 
Fukushima event being more recent, it is pertinent to analyze the data from the event.  
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 Radiological responses may never involve an ideal situation like many exercises in 
which emergency response professionals participate. The Chernobyl and Fukushima 
incidents show how far from ideal real world scenarios can be. The International Nuclear 
and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was introduced in 1990 by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The INES categorizes events on a scale of 1-7, where 7 
is a major accident. According to the INES scale there have only been two major 
accidents, those at Chernobyl and Fukushima. Chernobyl was considered a level 7 
because of the magnitude of the radiological release, but Fukushima was initially 
considered a 4 on the INES scale. After much political pressure the Fukushima incident 
was categorized as a level 7. When comparing the releases of the Chernobyl and 
Fukushima incidents the Japanese authorities estimated that the radioactivity released 
from the Fukushima plant was only about 10% of that was released from the Chernobyl 
plant (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2011). The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
estimated that the total discharge from the Fukushima-Daiichi plant was approximately 
1.6x1017 Bq for 131I and 1.5x1016 Bq for 137Cs (Nuclear Emergency Response 
Headquarters GOJ, 2011). The estimated total discharge from the Chernobyl accident 
was 1.76x1018 Bq for 131I and 8.5x1016 Bq for 137Cs (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002). 
There are clear differences in the magnitude of the releases but this was most likely due 
to factors such as reactor design and containment, along with completely different 
accident scenarios.  
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Chernobyl Accident 
 In 1986, the Chernobyl accident took place and sparked a change in how the public 
perceived the risk of nuclear power. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant was located in 
Ukraine about 20 km south of the border of Belarus. On August 25th, 1986 Unit 4 of the 
power plant was scheduled to be shut down for routine maintenance. The Unit 4 reactor 
was a RBMK-1000 Soviet-designed reactor that was a graphite moderated boiling light 
water reactor. A basic design of the RBMK-1000 is shown in Fig. 1 (NEA OECD, 
2002).The reactor fuel was uranium dioxide enriched to 2% 235U. The RBMK-1000 
design provided a direct steam feed from the reactor to the turbines. The water in the 
reactor fuel channels acted as a coolant and also provided steam to power the turbines. 
While the routine shut down took place, personnel decided to test if the slowing turbines 
could provide enough power to operate the emergency equipment and cooling systems, 
until the emergency power supply could take over. During the turbine test there were 
inadequate safety precautions and the personnel implementing the test were not aware of 
the nuclear safety implications, because they did not have adequate knowledge in the 
areas and did not speak with the appropriate personnel prior to the test. The turbine test 
had been performed during a shutdown before but the results were inconclusive, which 
led to personnel repeating the experiment.  
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Fig. 1. RMBK-1000 reactor design (NEA OECD, 2002). 
 
 
The test ultimately resulted in two explosions that led to fuel, core components and 
structural items along with other hot and highly radioactive debris being released into the 
air and environment. The explosions led to a wide spread release of fission products and 
noble gases to the northwest of the plant. Graphite fires started in the Unit 4 building 
giving rise to clouds of steam and dust, which contributed to the dispersion of 
radionuclides and fission products high into the atmosphere. The radiological release 
from the accident continued for about 20 days. Estimates of radionuclide releases during 
the Chernobyl accident are given in Table 1. (NEA OECD, 2002).   
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Table 1. Estimated reactor core inventory and estimated radionuclide releases from the 
Chernobyl accident (NEA OECD, 2002).  
Reactor Core Inventory (April 26
th
, 1986) Total release during the accident 
Nuclide Half-life Activity Activity (PBq) % of inventory 
released 
Activity (PBq) 
133Xe 5.3 d 6500 100 6500 
131I 8.0 d 3200 50-60 ~1760 
134Cs 2.0 y 180 20-40 ~54 
137Cs 30.0 y 280 20-40 ~84 
132Te 78.0 h 2700 25-60 ~1150 
89Sr 52.0 d 2300 4-6 ~115 
90Sr 28.0 y 200 4-6 ~10 
140Ba 12.8 d 4800 4-6 ~240 
95Zr 65.0 f 5600 3.5 196 
99Mo 67.0 h 4800 >3.5 >168 
103Ru 39.6 d 4800 >3.5 >168 
106Ru 1.0 y 2100 >3.5 >73 
141Ce 33.0 d 5600 3.5 196 
144Ce 285.0 d 3300 3.5 ~116 
239Np 2.4 d 27000 3.5 ~95 
238Pu 86.0 y 1 3.5 0.035 
239Pu 24400.0 y 0.85 3.5 0.03 
240Pu 6580.0 y 1.2 3.5 0.042 
241Pu 13.2 y 170 3.5 ~6 
242Cm 163.0 d 26 3.5 ~0.9 
 
 
 
The source term for the accident was extremely complex due to the graphite fires, 
which created extensive releases of fuel material and attributed to a long radiological 
release. During the first days of the release, weather conditions were changing constantly 
causing variations in the direction and dispersion of the release from the accident. 
Radionuclide depositions depend greatly on the weather conditions, especially wind and 
rainfall. Particle size also factored into the final deposition of the radionuclides. Larger 
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particles tended to deposit closer to the plant than small particles. The largest particles 
released from the Chernobyl accident were primarily fuel particle. The largest particles 
deposited within 100 km of the reactor. Smaller particles traveled large distances within 
the plume until finally depositing, mostly due to rainfall (NEA OECD, 2002). 
Contamination from the Chernobyl reactor was found on the ground in almost every 
country in the northern hemisphere. Deposition of 137Cs in Belarus and Ukraine as a 
result of the Chernobyl accident is shown in Fig. 3 and 4, respectively. For the 
Chernobyl accident 137Cs was used to characterize the magnitude of the radionuclide 
depositions on the ground. I-131 was not used for this characterization because its half-
life is extremely short compared to 137Cs.  Early maps created in the former Soviet 
Union were based on the small number of 131I measurements; even though 137Cs was 
used as a guide to characterize the magnitude of the ground depositions. From the early 
maps it was found that the deposition densities of 131I to 137Cs varied spatially 
throughout Belarus. The ratios varied from about 5 to 10 (NEA OECD, 2002).  The 131I 
to 137Cs ratio was not studied much in other countries after the Chernobyl incident 
though. The variance in the 131I to 137Cs ratio was most likely due to the constantly 
changing weather conditions at the time of the accident. In regards to radionuclide 
depositions little information was found pertaining to the Chernobyl incident. 
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Fig. 2. Deposition of 137Cs in Belarus as a result of the Chernobyl Accident. (NEA 
OECD, 2002). 
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Fig. 3. Deposition of 137Cs in Ukraine as a result of the Chernobyl Accident. (NEA 
OECD, 2002). 
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Fukushima-Daiichi Incident 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) was located in the Fukushima 
Prefecture, facing the Pacific Ocean. The area of the site was approximately 864.9 acres 
and the station was operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). 
Fukushima-Daiichi was the first NPS to be operated by TEPCO;  the first unit was 
commissioned in March 1971. The NPS had a total of six reactors with a total electric 
generating capacity of about 4.696 million kilowatts. Information for all six of the 
Fukushima-Daiichi units is shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Six Units of the Fukushima-Daiichi NPS. 
 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 
Electric output 
(MW) 
460 784 784 784 784 1100 
Start of 
construction 
Sep. 1967 May 
1969 
Oct. 
1970 
Sep. 1972 Dec. 
1971 
May 
1973 
Commissioning Mar. 
1971 
Jul. 1974 Mar. 
1976 
Oct. 1978 Apr. 
1978 
Oct. 
1979 
Decommissioning Apr. 
2012 
Apr. 
2012 
Apr. 
2012 
Apr. 2012   
Reactor type BWR-3 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-4 BWR-5 
Containment type Mark I  Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark II 
Number of fuel 
assemblies 
400 548 548 548 548 764 
Number of 
control rods 
97 137 137 137 137 185 
 
 
 
According to the Government of Japan (GOJ) report to the IAEA, the chronological 
events of the incident were the following. On March 11th, 2011 an earthquake occurred 
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in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Japan  registering a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter 
scale. Several aftershocks, all which had a magnitude of 5 or greater, followed the 
earthquake. The location of the epicenter of the earthquake with respect to the location 
of several nuclear power plants in Japan can be seen in Fig. 5 (Nuclear Emergency 
Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). The magnitude 9.0 earthquake caused a massive 
tsunami, which arrived at the Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures 
twenty-eight minutes after the initial earthquake. The damage from the earthquake and 
tsunami resulted in a flooded area of about 561 km2, along with damage to 
approximately 475,000 structures and approximately 4,000 spots of road damage, 7280 
spots of damage to railways and 4 million households were left without electricity 
(Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). Following the damage from 
the tsunami a nuclear accident occurred at the Fukushima-Daiichi NPS. The damage 
from the tsunami contributed to a lengthy radiological release throughout Japan.  
12 
 
 
Fig. 4. Location of epicenter of the earthquake is shown with the resulting seismic 
intensity throughout Japan (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). 
 
 
On April 9th 2011, TEPCO reported that the initial tsunami arrived at about 15:27 
Japan Standard Time (JST). According to the tide gauges the height of the tsunami was 
approximately 4 meters. The second major tsunami arrived at 15:35 JST but the water 
level was unknown because there was a tide gauge failure. The maximum scale of the 
tide gauge was 7.5 meters, so it was assumed the tsunami height was greater than 7.5 
meters. An image released by TEPCO of the tsunami hitting the Fukushima NPS is 
shown in Fig. 5. Experts estimated that the tsunami height was more than 10 meters 
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(Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). The design at the Fukushima-
Daiichi NPS did not contain seawalls high enough to prevent flooding from tsunamis of 
this magnitude. The earthquake caused damage to breakers and transmission lines for the 
Fukushima-Daiichi plant, which resulted in all external power supplies being lost for 
Units 1 thru 6.  Along with external power supplies being lost from the earthquake all of 
the component cooling sea water pump facilities were flooded by the tsunami. The 
emergency diesel generators in the basements of Units 1 thru 5 were also flooded.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Tsunami waves approaching the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, in a 
photo released by TEPCO (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). 
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Prior to the earthquake on March 11th, 2011, Units 1-3 were operating at a constant 
power. At the time Unit 1 was operating with 400 fuel assemblies and had 392 fuel 
assemblies in its spent fuel pool. Unit 2 was operating with 548 fuel assemblies and had 
615 fuel assemblies in its spent fuel pool. Unit 3 was operating with 548 fuel assemblies, 
32 of which were MOX fuel assemblies. Units 4-6 were undergoing periodic inspections 
at the time and were disconnected from the power grid (Nuclear Emergency Response 
Headquarters GOJ, 2011). 
The initial magnitude 9.0 earthquake quickly brought Units 1-3 into an automatic 
shutdown. Following the automatic shutdown the power generators were tripped, so the 
power supply for the NPS was switched to an off-site power supply. Even though the 
power supply was switched to off-site the NPS was not able to receive electricity 
because some of the transmission towers had collapsed, as a result of the earthquake. 
With no off-site power supply the NPS had to start the diesel generators to cool the 
reactors and spent fuel pools.  
Once the tsunami hit all of the emergency generators for Units 1-5 became 
submerged. Without operating diesel generators the NPS lost all alternating current (AC) 
power for Units 1-5. TEPCO then opened up the isolation condensers (IC) system in 
Unit 1 and continued to inject fresh water into its shell side to maintain the IC functions. 
Units 2 and 3 were being cooled by the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) as 
of March 12th, so the pressure and water levels at the time were stable in the primary 
containment vessels. In an attempt to recover the power supply for the units TEPCO 
requested emergency power supply vehicles. At 23:00 on March 11th it was confirmed 
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that radiation levels in the turbine building of Unit 1 were increasing. Soon after TEPCO 
acknowledged that the primary containment vessel may have exceeded its maximum 
operating pressure. Following Japan’s Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act TEPCO 
was ordered to reduce the pressure of Units 1 and 2. On March 12th at 5:46 TEPCO 
started to inject fresh water into Unit 1, along with preparing to perform pressure vents 
for the containment vessel. The high radiation levels in the reactor building were causing 
difficulties when trying to perform this task. Subsequently, a few hours after a pressure 
decrease was confirmed a hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 1 reactor building.  
On March 12th at 11:36 the RCIC system for Unit 3 stopped and the high pressure 
core injection (HPCI) system was automatically turned on. Activation of the HPCI 
helped to maintain a constant water level in the reactor. At 2:42 on March 13th the HPCI 
system for Unit 3 stopped working, so TEPCO resorted to using fire engines to begin 
fresh water injection into the reactor along with pressure vents. The pressure was 
continuing to increase, so several vents were performed to decrease the primary 
containment vessel pressure. Even with several pressure vents at 11:01 on March 14th 
another hydrogen explosion occurred in the Unit 3 reactor building.  
On March 14th it was determined that the water level was decreasing in Unit 2 
because the RCIC had stopped. TEPCO began to try to reduce the pressure in the reactor 
pressure vessel and inject water into the vessel. At around 11:00 on March 13th the 
primary containment vessel had exceeded its maximum operating pressure. 
Subsequently, on March 15th at 6:00 JST another assumed hydrogen explosion occurred 
near the Unit 2 suppression chamber. Another hydrogen explosion also occurred in the 
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Unit 4 reactor building at around the same time as the Unit 3 explosion. On March 15th 
at 22:00, following regulations, TEPCO began to inject water into the Unit 4 spent fuel 
pool because cooling and water supplying functions were lost for the spent fuel pool.  
The pressure in Unit 5, which also lost total AC power, was also increasing, but 
TEPCO was able to maintain the pressure and water level by injecting water into the 
reactor. Ultimately, TEPCO was able to bring Unit 5 to a cold shutdown at around 14:30 
on March 20th. As for Unit 6, there were some effects pertaining to the earthquake and 
tsunami, but pressure and water levels were maintained. Pressure and water levels in 
Unit 6 were maintained because one of the diesel generators continued to operate. 
Between the 6 reactor units there were 11 possible radiological releases between March 
11th-23rd, in the form of explosions, pressure vents and fires (Mena, 2012). The direction 
of the release changed several times because of weather conditions, but the primary 
direction of the plume was to the northwest of the plant. The plume direction can be seen 
in Fig. 6. The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) estimated that the total 
discharge from the Fukushima Daiichi plant was approximately 1.6x1017 Bq for 131I and 
1.5x1016 Bq for 137Cs (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). 
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Fig. 6. Fukushima-Daiichi release plume from aerial measurements taken by U.S. and 
Japan teams (Reed, 2012). 
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In summary it was clear that a series of events led to the devastation at the 
Fukushima-Daiichi NPS. The accident was a direct result of the earthquake and ensuing 
tsunami that hit the NPS. The accident resulted in severe core damage for Units 1 
through 3. Units 5 and 6 were able to successfully reach cold shutdowns without causing 
any damage to the reactors cores. Emergency response steps were taken to try to control 
the accident but the magnitude of the incident was overwhelming with the flooding and 
loss of power to many emergency and safety features.  
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Radiological 
Assessment Assumptions 
When an incident such as Fukushima occurs one of the most important aspects of an 
effective nuclear/radiological emergency response is the radiological assessment 
process. The FRMAC, which acts as the hub for all data collected by responders, 
performs a concise analysis of the data from a radiological event. The main objective of 
a FMRAC assessment is to understand and interpret the radiological conditions and 
provide guidance to decision makers.  
During exercises, and even the initial phases of a response, default assumptions are 
used for assessment calculations. These default assumptions are only used until data 
specific to the incident site are obtained for use. In the FRMAC Assessment Manual 
there are 10 specific default assumptions. These are: 
1. Dose projections can include contributions from either two or four exposure 
pathways: 
a. Two-Path Assessment involves the ground pathways: 
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i. External exposure due to groundshine from deposited material 
from the release 
ii. Inhalation due to resuspension of deposited material 
b. Four-Pathway Assessment involves the plume and ground pathways: 
i. External exposure due to groundshine from deposited material 
from the release 
ii. Inhalation due to resuspension of deposited material 
iii. External exposure due to being submersed in the passing plume 
iv. Inhalation of radioactive material from the passing plume 
2. The receptor is assumed to be in the plume, so the plume is assumed to be in 
contact with the ground. 
3. Any material deposited by the passing plume is assumed to be immediately 
and completely deposited at the beginning of the passage of the plume 
4. Noble Gas Dose Projections: 
Radionuclides that are noble gases when released: 
a. Are assumed to remain as gases during meteorological transport, even 
if they decay into a particulate daughter during the transport time 
b. Are included in the external dose assessment from submersion in a 
plume 
c. Are not assigned an inhalation dose coefficient, so they do not 
contribute to inhalation dose 
d. Are not deposited on the ground, so they are not included in ground 
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pathway assessment calculations 
e. Noble gases that are daughters of ground-deposited radionuclides are 
assumed to remain on the ground and are not included in ground 
pathway assessment calculations. 
5. The effects of radioactive decay, weathering and resuspension are included in 
the calculations. 
6. All depositions are assumed to be dry particulates. Wet deposition due to 
increased localized deposition caused by rain or snow is not included  
7. Dose from ingestion is not included in Public Protection Methods.  
8. The receptor is: 
a. An adult; 
b. Outside in the contaminated area continuously without any protective 
measures; 
c. Inhaling 1-micron Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) 
particles in the lung class which provides the maximum dose.  
i. Default inhalation dose coefficients and deposition velocities 
are used based on the assumed particle size. If actual particle 
size is known, this information is used. 
9. The Bateman Equations are used to model the decay and in-growth of all 
radionuclides. 
10. The FRMAC public protection methods generally assume the organ of interest 
is the whole body. Other organs may be evaluated against the Protective 
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Action Guidelines (PAGs) by utilizing organ-specific Dose Coefficients and 
PAGs. 
During the exercises in which emergency response teams participate, the scenario and 
release parameters are well defined and fixed (Musolino, 2012). Assumptions are made 
about the plume, dose projections, radionuclide depositions and the receptors (Sandia 
National Laboratory, 2012). Along with the FRMAC Assessment Manual Default 
Assumptions, another main assumption during exercises is that the radionuclide 
deposition ratios will remain constant, only varying in terms of radioactive decay and 
weathering. This assumption is sometimes made regardless of large spatial and terrain 
variations.  
During a radiological assessment for a reactor accident, two of the primary 
radionuclides of interest for radiological dose assessors are iodine and cesium. After a 
radiological incident the iodine isotopes, mainly 131I, are the primary dose contributors 
for the first two months. After the iodine isotopes have decayed away, the main dose 
contributors are the cesium isotopes, specifically 137Cs. All of the possible paths of 
exposure for these radionuclides are considered during a radiological assessment as 
shown in the Fig. 7. Responders try to collect data quickly after an accident, to better 
understand how the plume is travelling and how the radionuclides in the plume will 
deposit on the ground. Several factors contribute to how the radionuclides will travel, 
such as wind direction, precipitation, and properties of the radionuclides upon release. 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Major steps in a radiological assessment [adapted from NCRP (1984a)] 
(Eisenbud, Merril, Gesell, T., 1997). 
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With any radiological release from a reactor, many aspects need to be taken into 
account when it comes to the release of fission products and their behavior. The release 
of the fission products depends upon the chemical form, reaction and behavior in the 
primary system and the release location in the system.  With the possibility of different 
release points, there becomes the possibility of many paths of travel. Many paths of 
travel means that there will also be different residence times and temperatures, which 
have an influence on the chemical reactions and the transport of the fission products. The 
path of travel for fission products through a reactor system is very complex since 
aerosols and volatile substances may deposit on walls or in pipes and be resuspended 
into the system. Homogenous and heterogeneous gas reactions can occur during the 
transport, which can considerably change the properties of the fission products. Gas 
reactions in turn can have an effect on the behavior of the fission products once they are 
released to the environment. So, from the initial release point to the final deposition 
point of fission products there are several factors that can affect deposition patterns, 
which can make a radiological assessment very complex for responders (Neeb, 1997). 
All of these factors contribute to the source term for the incident, one of the first 
estimates responders try to determine in the initial phases of a response. 
Previous Research/Analysis 
 Literature pertaining to research done with respect to radionuclide deposition ratios is 
scarce. No literature was found specifically regarding radionuclide depositions of 131I, 
134Cs, 136Cs, and 137Cs, from the Chernobyl accident. In the literature, it was noted that 
the radionuclide ratio of 131I to 137Cs varied spatially throughout Belarus. Analysis of 
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maps showed that the 131I to 137Cs ratio varied from approximately a factor of 5 to 10 
throughout Belarus (NEA OECD, 2002). Yet, the 131I to 137Cs ratio was not studied over 
time in other countries after the Chernobyl accident. During the response to the 
Fukushima incident, analyses were performed pertaining to radionuclide distributions 
and concentrations using both air samples and in situ measurements.  
After the accident an analysis of radionuclide ratios was performed using the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System 
(IMS). The IMS is comprised of four monitoring technologies for monitoring nuclear 
explosions of any kind. These technologies are: radionuclide, seismic, hydroacoustic, 
and infrasound. For the study after the Fukushima accident, the IMS stations in the U.S. 
for radionuclide monitoring were used. Radionuclide ratio data collected by the 
monitoring stations were used to compare data between stations and to show that the 
source of the radioactivity was from the Fukushima accident. The study was done to 
evaluate the overall capabilities of the system (Biegalski et. al., 2011). 
 The distance from the site of the accident to the closest U.S. IMS monitoring stations 
was over four thousand miles. Particulate measurements showed that iodine and cesium 
produced the highest number of detections at the particulate collection stations. The 
particulate collections at 10 of the monitoring stations showed that the 134Cs/137Cs ratio 
was relatively constant at ~1 over a period of about one month, as shown in Fig. 8. The 
134Cs/137Cs ratio was expected to stay fairly constant for the first few months after the 
accident since the half-lives are 2.06 years and 30.2 years, respectively. The 136Cs/137Cs 
ratio was also studied over the same time period. The 136Cs/137Cs ratio varied between 
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the different IMS stations but followed an exponential decay overtime, because 136Cs has 
a short half-life of 13 days, compared to the half-life of 137Cs. The trend for 136Cs/137Cs 
is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. 134Cs/137Cs isotopic activity ratio for US IMS stations (1  error bars) (Biegalski 
et. al., 2011). 
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Fig. 9. 136Cs/137Cs isotopic activity ratio for US IMS stations (1  error bars) (Biegalski 
et. al., 2011). 
 
 
 
The U.S. IMS study shows that the travel of radionuclides such as cesium and iodine 
should not cause the concentration ratios to vary greatly. Though the travel of the 
radionuclides may not affect the concentration ratios in air samples this does not mean 
that the radionuclide concentration ratios will not change when the radionuclides 
deposit. 
An analysis was also performed for data from the early stages of the response in 
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March, with respect to the two rainfall events that took place in Japan. Contour maps for 
the radionuclide depositions throughout east-central Japan are shown in Fig. 10. Two 
rain effects occurred in March on the 15-16th and the 21st. The amount of rainfall was 
based on the Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition System (AMeDAS), which is 
a high resolution surface observation network developed by the Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA). AMeDAS is used to gather regional weather data to help verify forecast 
performance. According to the AMeDAS continual rainfall occurred between 1700 
hours on March 15 and 0400 hours on March 16 in the northern Fukushima Prefecture. 
The next rain event occurred between 0800 hours on March 21 and 0600 hours on March 
23 in the Ibaraki, Chiba, Tochigi, and Saitama prefectures and in Tokyo (Kinoshita et. 
al., 2011). The contour maps for the rain events are shown in Fig. 11. 
The contour maps from Fig. 10 show that throughout Japan the radionuclide 
depositions were varying spatially. It can be seen that there was an increase in the 
activity of several radionuclides to the northwest of the plant. There was also a clear 
increase in the 131I/137Cs ratio to the south-southwest of the plant. The region to the 
south-southwest of the plant was one of the areas of Japan which received an increase in 
precipitation as seen in Fig. 11. This analysis shows that depositions of certain 
radionuclides will vary throughout an area, especially if there is an increase in 
precipitation.  
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Fig. 10. Contour maps of depositions for several radionuclides; and activity ratios for 
129mTe∕137Cs, 131I∕137Cs, and 129mTe∕131I through Japan are shown. Activities from March 
29th, 2011 are shown. (Kinoshita et. al., 2011) 
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Fig. 11. Amount of rainfall in Japan on March 15-16th and March 21, based on 
AMeDAS (Kinoshita et. al., 2011).  
 
 
 
 While in Japan the DOE/NNSA CMRT and other response teams evaluated the 
radiological situation using in situ measurements, soil and air samples. To determine the 
consistency of the radionuclide mixture from the release the activity ratios for 134Cs to 
137Cs were followed for 158 in situ measurements and 174 air samples (Musolino et. al., 
2012). The analytical results of the in situ measurements and air samples are shown in 
Fig.12 and Fig. 13, respectively (Musolino et. al., 2012). The 134Cs/137Cs ratio was very 
consistent for both the air and in situ samples, maintaining a ratio of ~ 1. The 
concentrations of 134Cs and 137Cs did vary throughout Japan but the ratio of 134Cs to 
137Cs did not vary (Musolino et. al., 2012).  A consistent ratio for 134Cs to 137Cs was 
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expected for the first few months after the release because the half-lives of both of these 
radionuclides are long compared to the time frame of the data set. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios for 158 in situ measurements. Figure courtesy of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Musolino et. al., 2012). 
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Fig. 13. 134Cs/137Cs activity ratios for 174 air samples. Figure courtesy of Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (Musolino et. al., 2012). 
 
 
 
Both the CMRT and the DOD collected data in Japan. The CMHT performed an 
analysis of the cesium/iodine ratio with data collected around the U.S. Embassy/Tokyo 
area, the CMRT field samples and the DOD measurement data. The sampling periods for 
the CMRT and DOD data were March 20-26 and March 13-25, respectively. The ratio 
comparison for the U.S. Embassy/Tokyo area, CMRT field samples and DOD 
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measurement data are shown in Table 3. The original comparison was for 134Cs and 
137Cs to total iodine but for Table 3 the ratios were inverted to show the131I/137Cs ratio.  
 
 
Table 3. Iodine/137Cs ratio and its associated standard deviation are given for data from 
CMRT and DOD data. 
Data Source Iodine/137Cs STD (±) 
Embassy/Tokyo 45.45 27.03 
Field Samples 29.41 21.74 
DOD 7.14 8.33 
 
 
 
The research reported here focuses on the analysis of spectra from the in situ 
measurements made by the CMRT along with measurements made by representatives of 
the GOJ after departure of the CMRT. The literature review shows that analyses of 
radionuclide depositions were performed by the CMRT. But these analyses were 
performed with data sets of less than 200 measurements from the early phases of their 
response in Japan. This research discussed here consists of a larger data set, which is 
necessary for an effective analysis. In this research, analysis of the in situ measurements 
was conducted to ascertain whether the infield assumptions the U.S. response teams 
made were valid during a real-life response. 
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METHODS AND MATERIALS 
DOE/NNSA CMRT Data 
The field measurements taken in Japan by the CMRT were used to perform the 
radionuclide deposition analysis for this research. All of the data collected by the CMRT 
were stored in the DOE Radiological Assessment and Monitoring System (RAMS). In 
total there were approximately 250,000 data files within RAMS from the Fukushima 
response. For the purpose of the research only the in situ measurement data were 
extracted. There were 292 in situ measurement data files, which included raw spectra, 
collection date, sample number, sample instrument, field team, latitude, longitude, 
sampling time, live time, exposure rate and measurement height. Not every file had the 
complete information but all of the spectra were identified with the collection date and 
associated latitude and longitude. Latitude and longitude were necessary to determine 
the spatial variations in the radionuclide deposition ratios. All of the information for the 
in situ measurements was consolidated into a spreadsheet and each associated spectrum 
was analyzed using the Ortec GammaVision® software. A peak analysis was performed 
on each spectrum to determine the net counts under each photopeak of interest. Peak 
analysis was performed for the following radionuclides; 134Cs, 136Cs, 137Cs and 131I. Each 
radionuclide has one or more photons associated with its decay, so the photon with the 
highest branching ratio for each radionuclide was used for the peak analysis. The 
associated gamma-ray energies and branching ratios for the radionuclides used were: 
604 keV (97.6%), 818 keV (100%), 662 keV (84.62%) and 364 keV (81.24%), 
respectively. 
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The net counts under the photopeak for each radionuclide was recorded along with 
their associated uncertainty. The net counts and uncertainties were input into the same 
spreadsheet with all of the measurement information, and deposition ratios were 
calculated. The ratios were calculated for 134Cs, 136Cs and 131I relative to 137Cs. These 
ratios allowed comparison of all of the radionuclide depositions to each other at specific 
locations. When calculating the ratios, the uncertainties for the net counts for each 
photopeak were propagated to determine the uncertainty of the deposition ratios. In 
addition to comparing the deposition ratios to each other, they were also compared to the 
values shown in Table 4. This table was obtained from the FRMAC Assessment Manual 
Volume 3, which gave isotopic ratios for a LWR core-damage accident. The table gives 
the concentration of thirty-nine radionuclides relative to 137Cs for specific times after the 
shutdown of a LWR. The values from this table were compared against the calculated 
values because the values in the table accounted for decay of deposited radionuclides 
after a reactor shutdown. This allowed the data obtained at Fukushima to be compared to 
the FRMAC values since the Fukushima reactors were shut down after the initial 
earthquake.  
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Table 4. Radionuclide concentrations relative to 137Cs for a LWR core-damage accident 
are given for specific times after reactor shutdown. (Sandia National Laboratory, 2003). 
Radionuclide to 
137
Cs Ratio Time After Shutdown 
Radionuclide  1 hr 6 hr 12 hr 24 hr 3 days 7 days 15 days 30 days 
132
Te  12.2 11.7 11.1 10.0 6.5 2.8 0.5 0.0 
131
I  18.1 17.7 17.4 16.6 14.0 9.9 5.0 1.4 
132
I  23.7 14.5 11.8 10.3 6.7 2.9 0.5 0.0 
133
I  35.6 30.1 24.7 16.5 3.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 
135
I  30.3 17.9 9.6 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
134
Cs  1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
136
Cs  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 
137
Cs  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
 
 
The deposition ratios for 136Cs/137Cs and 131I/137Cs could only be compared to the 
values in Table 4 for periods between one and two weeks after the shutdown of the 
reactors because the first spectrum collected by the CMRT used for this research was 
collected on 17 March 2011, approximately one week after shutdown. The first in situ 
measurement spectrum did not show the presence of 136Cs or 137Cs, so it was not used. 
The first spectrum used was collected on 20 March 2011, which was a little over a week 
from the shutdown of the reactors.   
The deposition ratios from in situ measurements on 20 March 2011 for 136Cs/137Cs 
and 131I/137Cs were averaged to represent the concentrations of 136Cs and 131I, relative to 
137Cs for comparison to the FRMAC values, one week after shutdown. The deposition 
ratios represent in situ measurements taken about nine days after initial reactor shut 
down. The data set used did not contain in situ measurements from exactly one week 
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after shut down, which is why the deposition ratios from about nine days after shut down 
were used for comparison. In order to make the comparison at two weeks for 136Cs, the 
136Cs/137Cs ratios for in situ measurements taken between the 25th and 29th were 
averaged. Data from several days had to be averaged to represent the ratio for two 
weeks, because only one in situ measurement showed the presence of 136Cs on the 25th, 
which is exactly two weeks after reactor shutdown. The 131I/137Cs ratios from in situ 
measurements taken on the 25th were averaged to represent the 131I ratio for two weeks 
after shutdown. The average ratios of 136Cs/137Cs and 131I/137Cs, approximately one and 
two weeks after shut down, were used to compare to the concentrations given in Table 4.  
In Table 4, the concentration of 134Cs relative to 137Cs is not expected to change even 
30 days after shutdown, because the half-lives of both cesium isotopes are much longer 
than 30 days. For the 134Cs ratio all the values were averaged from 20 March 2011 to 2 
July 2011. The average values for the 134Cs/137Cs, and the average values for 136Cs/137Cs 
and 131I/137Cs, one and two weeks after shutdown, were compared to the values in Table 
4 to determine how closely they related. Next, all of the calculated deposition ratios over 
the whole data set time frame were plotted as a function of time, to determine whether or 
not the respective decay rates were followed.  
 To visualize the locations of the in situ measurements throughout Japan, ESRI 
software ArcMap 10.1 was utilized.  These plots provided the exact locations of the in 
situ measurements and allowed determination of the location of hot spots. The software 
produced maps were compared to NNSA aerial monitoring results and National 
Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) simulations to determine if the trends 
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of the in situ measurements followed the path of the plume. Mapping and analyzing 
these data made it simple to determine whether or not the deposition ratios were varying 
spatially throughout Japan.  
Digital elevation model (DEM) data for Japan (United States Geological Survey, 
2013) were also used to obtain a better visualization of the changes in elevation 
throughout Japan. This information aided in determining whether elevation changes had 
more of a significant impact on the deposition of particulates like cesium or more 
volatile radionuclides such as iodine.  
JAEA 
134
Cs and 
137
Cs Variation Data 
Cesium in situ measurement data acquired by the GOJ were also analyzed. These data 
consisted of four different data sets at the same location for many locations throughout 
Japan. There was the second measurement, third prophase (before typhoon season) 
measurement, third anaphase (after typhoon season) measurement, and fourth 
measurement.1 The second measurement consisted of 1016 in situ measurements taken 
between 14 December 2011 and 28 May 2012. The third prophase measurement 
consisted of 387 in situ measurements taken between 13 August 2012 and 19 September 
2012. The third anaphase measurement included 380 measurements taken between 5 
November 2012 and 12 December 2012. The fourth measurement included 382 in situ 
measurements taken between 13 June 2013 and 10 July 2013.  
Using the GOJ 134Cs and 137Cs variation data, the 134Cs/137Cs ratio was calculated for 
the specific measurement locations. Once the cesium ratios were calculated for each data 
                                                          
1 Prophase and anaphase in this case refer to the distribution of seasons in Japan.  
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set, the data were plotted according to the measurement date to determine if there were 
any fluctuations with the cesium ratio. The data were also plotted using ESRI software 
ArcMap 10.1 to obtain an idea of the spatial locations of the in situ measurements 
throughout Japan. If there were any fluctuations with the cesium data, mapping the data 
would help to determine the locations in Japan in which there may have been higher or 
lower cesium deposition ratios. The calculated 134Cs deposition ratio was also compared 
to the FRMAC Assessment Manual value in Table 4.  
The average of the ratios for each measurement set (second, third prophase, third 
anaphase, fourth) was calculated and decay corrected to determine if the deposition 
ratios were the same as the NNSA data at the time of those measurements.  
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RESULTS 
DOE/NNSA CMRT Data 
The 
134
Cs/
137
Cs Deposition Ratios 
When comparing the analyzed DOE/NNSA CMRT data to the FRMAC Assessment 
Manual Vol. 3 values in Table 4 there were some clear differences. According to Table 
4, the 134Cs/137Cs ratio should maintain a value of 1.6 up to 30 days after reactor 
shutdown. The value calculated from the CMRT data was 1.047 ± 0.051. These values 
are different but the CMRT data did show that 134Cs and 137Cs maintained a relatively 
constant ratio even 30 days after reactor shutdown. Figure 14 shows the trend of the 
134Cs/137Cs ratio for the whole CMRT in situ measurement data set. Figure 15 also shows 
that there were approximately 20 data points that deviated from the mean. These data 
points represent measurements with count rates comparable to background for both 
cesium isotopes. Analysis showed that the uncertainties were greater than 20%, because 
of the lack of counts under the photopeaks. The low count rates could be attributed to 
short detector live times or significant plume deposition may not have occurred at the 
time of the measurements. The live times for the measurements varied from 300-1800 
seconds. Though detector live times of 1800 seconds were not used until 22 May 2011, 
when the GOJ started to take the in situ measurements. All of the measurements that 
produced high uncertainties (>20%) for the 134Cs/137Cs ratio were from the Tokyo region 
of Japan, which was over 200 km from the accident site. The significant plume travel 
distance and plume depletion during travel are reasonable explanations for these low-
activity measurements. Figure 15 shows a map of Japan with the in situ measurement 
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locations marked along with the highlighted 134Cs/137Cs data points in the Tokyo region 
that had high uncertainties.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14. 134Cs/137Cs net counts ratio with respect to the date the measurements were 
taken. 
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Fig. 15. Map displaying in situ measurement locations with highlighted locations for the 
134Cs/137Cs values with uncertainties greater than 20%. 
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The 
136
Cs/
137
Cs Deposition Ratios 
The data for 136Cs/137Cs when plotted showed a relatively fast exponential decay as 
seen in Fig. 16, because the half-life of 136Cs is only 13 days. There were 7 out of 191 
data points that deviated from the curve but these data points had relatively high 
uncertainties that varied from 17-62%. The data collected by the CMRT covered about 
64,000 km2 of Japan, which was useful when determining spatial variance of the data 
points. The curve for 136Cs/137Cs showed that the 136Cs deposition ratio should not vary 
much even with respect to large spatial and terrain variations, much like 134Cs/137Cs. 
Approximately one week after reactor shutdown the deposition ratio for 136Cs was about 
0.13 ± 0.018, which does differ from the value of 0.4 given in Table 4. The analyzed in 
situ measurement data produced 136Cs ratios consistently lower than the FRMAC values 
in Table 4.  
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Fig. 16. 136Cs/137Cs net counts ratio with respect to the date the measurements were 
taken. 
 
 
The 
131
I/
137
Cs Deposition Ratios 
The 131I/137Cs data also followed an exponential decay as seen in Fig. 17 but the data 
fluctuated. The 131I/137Cs deposition in the early days of the response showed ratios 
significantly higher than expected. Table 4 shows that the 131I ratio should be 18.1 
approximately 1 hour after shutdown, yet the collected data shows 131I ratios as high as 
53.56 ± 2.68, over a week after shutdown. The high values from the 131I/137Cs data set 
were marked on a map to better show their location. The map is shown on Fig. 18 and all 
the high values appear to be towards the southwest of the nuclear power plants. During 
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the incident on 14 March 2011 when the Unit 3 explosion occurred, the wind direction 
had changed to the SSW of the plants (Blumenthal, 2012). Unit 3 was also operating 
with 548 fuel assemblies, including 32 MOX fuel assemblies (Nuclear Emergency 
Response Headquarters GOJ, 2011). It is unknown whether or not the percentage of 
MOX fuel would contribute to the deposition ratios being as high as they were in the 
area. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. 131I/137Cs net counts ratio with respect to the date the measurements were taken. 
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Fig. 18. Map displaying in situ measurement locations with highlighted locations for 
highest 131I/137Cs values. 
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Comparing FRAMC Assessment Manual Vol. 3 Values to DOE/NNSA Fukushima 
in situ Measurements 
Comparing the calculated values from Table 5 to the FRMAC Assessment Manual 
Vol. 3 values in Table 4 reveals some clear differences, especially with the 131I/137Cs 
concentration. The average value of 134Cs/137Cs ratio for the data set and the average 
value of the 136Cs/137Cs ratio for 1 and 2 weeks after shutdown were lower than the 
values from Table 4. As for the 131I/137Cs data, the calculated averages were higher than 
the values in Table 4. Most of the high 131I/137Cs values were to the southwest of the 
nuclear power plants. These high values have been provided in Table 6. There are many 
factors that could possibly contribute to the differences in the values from Table 4 and 
Table 5. The precipitation in Japan was considered to be the primary cause of 
depositions differences but elevation at the measurement sites was also considered.  
 
 
Table 5. Average ratios and standard deviations for the deposition ratios of interest 
(134Cs/137Cs, 136Cs/137Cs, 131I/137Cs) with respect to different times after shutdown. 
 134Cs/137Cs  
136
Cs/
137
Cs  
131
I/
137
Cs  
Average  1.047 0.09 0.033 0.0338   3.80 8.73 
Average 1 week 
after shutdown 
1.024 0.12 0.128 0.0077 36.85 8.61 
Average 2 week 
after shutdown 
1.052 0.30 0.100 0.0204 11.10 3.60 
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Table 6. The highest 131I/137Cs values located to the southwest of the nuclear power 
plants are given along with their associated uncertainty, latitude and longitude. 
Measurement Date: Latitude Longitude 
131
I/
137
Cs  Uncertainty (%) 
3-20-2011 37.235578 140.985693 49.65 3.43 
3-20-2011 37.001973 140.812589 38.26 4.31 
3-20-2011 36.903004 140.751618 25.90 3.58 
3-20-2011 36.797261 140.726352 33.57 3.66 
3-21-2011 37.124803 140.947787 53.56 2.68 
3-21-2011 37.067582 140.838236 51.03 6.41 
 
 
 
JAEA 
134
Cs and 
137
Cs Variation Data 
The in situ measurement data that the JAEA collected were not compared to the 
FRMAC values, because the collection date was past 30 days after reactor shutdown. 
The JAEA data were used to determine whether or not the 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio 
would change over longer time periods, for reasons other than radioactive decay. 
 The second measurement consisted of 1016 in situ measurements taken between 14 
December 2011 and 28 May 2012. The location of all 1016 in situ measurements are 
shown in Fig. 19. The 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio average for the measurements was 
0.78 with a standard deviation of 0.04. When the ratio was decay corrected to the time of 
the initial reactor shutdown a 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio of 1.06 was calculated. The 
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decay corrected value of 1.062 was not far from the average concentration ratio of 1.047 
calculated from the CMRT data. The decay corrected values for the 134Cs/137Cs 
concentration ratios for the third prophase, third anaphase, and fourth measurements 
were 1.068, 1.069, and 1.062, respectively. All of the data did not have associated 
measurement errors, so errors were not propagated when calculating the concentration 
ratios. The 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio averages and decay corrected averages for all 
four measurements are in Table 7. The data in Table 7 shows that even two years after 
an accident the cesium concentration ratio will remain constant only changing as a result 
of radioactive decay. Maps of the locations of all the in situ measurements and plots of 
the data for the second, third prophase, third anaphase, and fourth measurements are in 
Appendix A.  
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Fig. 19. Location of the 1016 in situ measurements for the 2nd measurement. 
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Table 7.  Average and decay corrected average of 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio from 
JAEA data. 
Measurement # of 
Measurements 
Average 
134
Cs/
137
Cs 
concentration 
ratio 
Standard 
Deviation 
Decay Corrected 
Average 
134
Cs/
137
Cs 
concentration ratio 
2
nd
 
Measurement 
1016 0.7819 0.0369 1.062 
3
rd
 Prophase 
Measurement 
387 0.6611 0.0305 1.068 
3
rd
 Anaphase 
Measurement 
380 0.6156 0.0295 1.069 
4
th
 
Measurement 
383 0.5104 0.0238 1.062 
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DISCUSSION 
When comparing the values in Table 5 and Table 6, it should be noted that there are 
differences between the FRMAC Manual Vol. 3 LWR reactor core damage scenario and 
the Fukushima-Daiichi Incident. The Fukushima-Daiichi Incident included severe core 
damage to several boiling water reactors. Along with the core damage of several reactors 
there were also a number of releases after shutdown. The FRMAC scenario was based 
on a 1000 MWe LWR with core damage and a prompt release. Release fractions for the 
scenario were averaged for both pressurized-water reactors (PWR) and boiling water 
reactors (BWR). The FRMAC scenario also assumed that all depositions were dry 
(Sandia National Laboratory, 2003). 
The FRMAC reactor core damage scenario was similar to an emergency response 
exercise that may take place, which is why the values in Table 4 were used despite the 
scenario differences. The values from Table 4 and data acquired from the Fukushima 
incident were not expected to match exactly because of the scenario differences. The 
Table 5 values were used to determine whether or not there would be extreme 
differences in the assumed depositions from exercises and actual accident depositions. 
The data from Fukushima for 134Cs/137Cs and 136Cs/137Cs showed no extreme differences 
and followed their expected decay curves over time. With respect to the cesium ratios, 
the values from assumptions made in exercises and trainings should not differ greatly 
from an actual accident scenario. The data for 131I/137Cs, however, shows that other 
possible considerations should be made during exercises and trainings for more volatile 
radionuclides such as iodine.  
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Data gathered during the incident showed that wet depositions in Japan during the 
incident did have a significant effect on the final deposition pattern ( NARAC. Private 
Communication. 25 October 2013). The increased precipitation throughout Japan may 
have been the cause of the increased deposition ratios for 131I/137Cs to the southwest of 
Fukushima-Daiichi. It also appeared as though the high depositions to the southwest 
were located at low elevation along the coastline. The location of the in situ 
measurements along with the Digital Elevation Model (DEM) can be seen in Fig. 20. 
The lighter portions of the DEM are areas where the elevation is higher than sea level 
and the darker portions are where elevation is closer to sea level. White dots on the map 
indicate the highest deposition ratios for 131I/137Cs. Based on a Lagrangian integrated 
trajectory model, HYSPLIT, the plume from the NPP had an altitude of 0-1000 meters 
and stayed in the Fukushima prefecture at 1700 hours on the 15th of March. The plume 
also stayed in the Ibaraki and Chiba prefecture at 1100 hours on the 21st of March. The 
plume stayed in these regions before the rain events that occurred so most of the 
radionuclides in the air were washed out by the precipitation. The increased 131I/137Cs 
deposition ratios to the southwest of the NPP could have possibly been caused by 
particulate material being blocked by the mountainous areas at higher elevations. The 
more volatile radionuclides such as 131I appeared to have been more easily transported 
than the particulates, such as 137Cs, in the mountainous area (Kinoshita et. al., 2011). The 
blockage of the particulates along with precipitation in the region seems to be the most 
probable cause for why the 131I/137Cs deposition ratios were higher at the lower 
elevations to the southwest of the NPP.  
53 
 
Another possible cause of the increase in the 131I/137Cs deposition ratios is the fallout 
of cesium particulates, over the ocean. When the plume travelled off the coast the 
particulates could have deposited off the coast and the remaining iodine and cesium 
could have been deposited along the coastline to the southwest of the NPP, when the 
plume returned over land. Another possibility that has not yet been validated is that the 
increased iodine deposition ratios to the southwest could be a direct result from the 
release of one specific reactor.  Unit 3 was operating with 32 MOX fuel assemblies, 
which would cause a slight difference in the amount of fission products in the fuel, but 
as mentioned before it is unknown whether or not the percentage of MOX fuel would 
contribute to the deposition ratios being as high as they were in the area. 
Deposition distance from the plant was also considered as a possible factor for an 
increased deposition ratio for 131I/137Cs. Initially, it was assumed that more iodine would 
deposit further away from the plant than cesium, since iodine is a reactive gas and 
cesium is more of a particulate. The in situ measurements did not show any correlation 
with respect to iodine and direct distance from the plant. For this reason, distance from 
the plant appears to have had no effect on the deposition of iodine and cesium in Japan. 
It was determined that whether the measurement location was on a wet, dry, disturbed, 
undisturbed or paved area could have an effect on the depositions (Musolino, 2012). The 
surface and atmospheric conditions can cause deposition rates to vary by a factor of 20 
or more for elements such as iodine and cesium (Sandia National Lab, 2003). Detailed 
environmental conditions at the measurement locations were not included in the data set. 
This information would have been helpful when trying to consider all of the conditions 
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at the specific measurement locations. Field notes such as these along with a larger data 
set would be necessary to determine the causes of fluctuations in the data. Without the 
measurement location information, it could not be determined if environmental 
conditions were the cause of the increased deposition of iodine to the southwest of the 
plant. 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Map of Japan with in situ measurement locations and DEMs. 
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 The 134Cs and 137Cs variation data from the JAEA helped to confirm what was 
observed with the 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratio with the CMRT data. When the 
134Cs/137Cs concentration ratios from the second, third prophase, third anaphase, and 
fourth measurements were decay corrected, the results were within ~0.2 of the average 
ratio from the CMRT data. The CMRT in situ measurement data set was relatively 
small, so a more robust data set of 2166 in situ measurements aided with confirming that 
the 134Cs/137Cs ratio overtime would remain constant only changing with respect to 
radioactive decay.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
From the analysis of the NNSA data and the conditions in Japan at the time of the 
incident, it is clear that many factors contribute to the final deposition patterns of 
radionuclides. Assumptions that emergency response workers make in the initial stages 
of accidents and during exercises seem to be valid for radionuclides such as cesium. The 
NNSA and JAEA data consisted of 5 data sets that were collected over a period of ~2.33 
years. Even though the measurements were taken at different times over this period, the 
134Cs/137Cs ratio remained constant only appearing to change as a result of radioactive 
decay. The 134Cs/137Cs ratio at the beginning of the response and the decay corrected 
ratios from the later measurements stayed between 1.04-1.06, which can be claimed as a 
constant ratio. The assumption of interest for this research was that radionuclide 
deposition ratios will remain constant, only varying in terms of radioactive decay and 
weathering. This assumption is at times made regardless of large spatial and terrain 
variation. But since the data set covered such a large spatial area of Japan consisting of 
many terrain variations the data set really helped to validate the assumption of interest 
specifically for the 134Cs/137Cs ratio.  
The data set for the 136Cs/137Cs consisted of only 192 in situ measurements, but did 
show a consistent exponential decay. Though there was a clear exponential decay a 
larger data set covering a larger area of Japan would be needed to confirm whether or 
not the 136Cs/137Cs ratio would remain constant, only changing as a result of radioactive 
decay. The data for 136Cs/137Cs would need to be obtained within the first 50 days after 
the accident because the half-life of 136Cs is relatively short at 13 days, so 50 days after 
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the Fukushima incident 136Cs would be difficult to detect compared to 134Cs and 137Cs. 
While the 134Cs/137Cs ratio helped to validate the assumption of interest, the 131I/137Cs 
ratio did not. The 131I/137Cs data showed that not every radionuclide will deposit and 
only vary in terms of radioactive decay and weathering. The 131I/137Cs ratios during the 
earlier stages of the response were significantly higher than expected in some areas of 
Japan. Ratios towards the SSW of the NPP were as high as 53.56, yet the FRMAC 
Assessment Manual says that one hour after reactor shutdown the ratio should only be 
about 18.1. With the small data set and the results for the 131I/137Cs ratio, it cannot be 
said for sure whether or not the emergency response training and exercise assumption of 
interest is valid. Based on the data, and without a larger data set at this time, it must be 
said that the assumption of interest for the 131I/137Cs ratio is not valid during a response 
with changing weather conditions. 
The data set that was analyzed for the purpose of this research was small. During the 
research there was a continuous search for in situ measurement data, with associated 
latitude, longitude and measurement information. Yet, no other complete data sets were 
found at the time. More data must be analyzed to be able to reach a conclusion on the 
validity of the assumption that the radionuclide deposition ratios will remain constant, 
only varying in terms of decay and weathering. Several data sets were examined, such as 
in situ measurement data from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & 
Technology in Japan (MEXT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Most 
of the data found did not have the associated latitudes and longitudes, which were a 
necessary part of the research plan. The data that was used in this research, taken by the 
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DOE/NNSA CMRT, was the best overall data set found. 
Further research is needed in order to determine the validity of the assumption of 
interest, if sufficient in situ measurement data are found. For the purpose of further 
research a robust in situ measurement data set from Japan, which has the associated 
latitude and longitude, measurement time, dead time and preferably the raw spectra from 
the in situ measurements, would be needed. During the research it also became clear 
how important information such as, measurement location conditions, elevation and 
precipitation data were when analyzing in situ measurement data. A data set with all of 
this information would allow for a more informative data analysis allowing for the 
consideration of spatial differences and several environmental conditions. 
It should be noted that the assumptions made during exercises and responses are 
conservative initially for simplicity before more information on the incident is known, 
such as the source term. Regardless, training and exercise assumptions could possibly be 
adjusted or changed to have responders better prepared in case of an incident of this 
magnitude, should these conditions occur again.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Fig. A- 1. 2nd Measurement in situ measurement locations. 
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Fig. A- 2. 3rd Prophase in situ measurement locations. 
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Fig. A- 3. 3rd Anaphase in situ measurement locations. 
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Fig. A- 4. 4th measurement in situ measurement locations. 
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Fig. A- 5. Plot for 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratios from 2nd measurement. 
 
 
Fig. A- 6. Plot for 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratios from 3rd prophase measurement. 
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Fig. A- 7. Plot for 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratios from 3rd anaphase measurement. 
 
 
 
Fig. A- 8. Plot for 134Cs/137Cs concentration ratios from 4th measurement. 
